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        American advisors to the RF/PF were assigned at national, corps, division and province level. They were never seen in the field within the 720th MP Battalion Tactical Area Of Responsibility.

Regional Forces (RF's) were recruited locally and operated under the Vietnamese province sector chief (Bien Hoa) or the district sub-sector chief (Long Binh).

Popular Forces (PF’s) were recruited at village level, operated under NCO's (Noncommissioned Officers) responsible to the village chief, and local ARVN (Army of The Republic of Vietnam) district chief (Bien Hoa), and were normally employed only in their local village areas.

        The shortage and the age of weapons prevented many of the local PF units from being properly armed. They were not allowed to take the weapons from their outpost unless on a village area patrol. The weapons were turned over to their relief when their shift ended and they returned to their the local village. In the event of a full scale call to duty the shortage would have been critical. After the larger US Infantry units were withdrawn under the Vietnamization program more modern weapons filtered down to the local PF forces.

        The Regional Forces (RF) light infantry company consisted of approximately 123 men, its heaviest weapon was the 60mm mortar. In addition, twenty-four river boat companies in III and IV Corps area were used for movement of troops and supplies and for medical evacuation missions.

        The PF had the lowest pay scale in the Vietnamese armed forces. A PF private, with a wife and two children, was paid at a flat rate of 2,200 piasters per month in the lowlands area or 2,400 piasters in the highlands (at 1968 exchange rates that amount to approximately $75.00 per month). An ARVN private with the same number off dependents, was given 3,690 piasters ($120.00 per month US) in pay and allowances. Families often lived with the PF, sharing their fortified positions by building their homes alongside them and often within them.

        The children were always coming by to visit with their fathers and especially the US MP’s who used to spoil them with hard candy, cool aid and their favorite treat "American bubble gum."

        In my year in the 720th TAOR I can't ever recall MP’s that I observed ever snubbing the local children. No matter what was going on the MP’s always found time to fuss with them or suddenly discover in their pockets those hidden treats sent from home for the kids.

        To many of us, that was what the war was all about, trying to give the children a brighter future.

        Many RF/PF’s were assigned to work directly attached to local U.S. Forces as scouts, guides and interpreters . In the 720th MP Battalion Tactical Area Of Responsibility (TAOR), MP’s were assigned to each of the four PF village outpost to assist with security and civic action programs.

        In the initial stages of Operation STABILIZE when the 720th TAOR was first established the trust factor between the local PF’s and the U.S. MP’s was almost non existent. Many of the MP’s felt the PF’s were not to be trusted and that they were communist sympathizers. This was primarily based on the fact that the PF’s were local and the four primary villages with the TAOR were ripe with VC activity before Operation STABILIZE.

       In the early stages of Operation STABILIZE (1967) Battalion HQ initiated a program of assigning a lone MP as an advisor to the local Village PF ambush teams. Because both the MP and PF squad lacked bilingual communication capabilities it turned into a total disaster and was ended quickly.

        On 15 October 1967 a twenty-one man PF Platoon lead by 24 year old SGT Huynh Van Hai, of Bien Hoa City, was attached to the 720th MP Battalion's B Company Platoon commanded by 2LT Robert S. Wilkerson and assigned to the TAOR.

        As time went by the MP’s eventually gained a respect for SGT Huynh and many of the PF’s The respect and trust continued to grow as MP’s eventually moved into the PF outpost in the TAOR and lived and worked with them daily.

       SGT Hai is shown right cleaning his weapon after a field operation. >

        Notwithstanding all the shortcomings of their unit structure and armament capabilities, most PF’s proved to be valuable conduits of intelligence from the local villagers, and many were brave beyond a fault when having to defend their homes and families from local Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) aggression.

        When a selected few of the local PF’s were assigned as scouts and interpreters to the Battalion Ambush and Reconnaissance Teams they were found to be a valuable asset. Their knowledge of the back rivers and trails outside the villages in which the grew up in often proved the difference between a safe and successful patrol or just another routine walk in the hot sun. They were expert in identifying the enemy routes of travel, and the local enemy operatives through the false identification documents they carried. They also obtained and passed along valuable information from their neighbors in the village who trusted them more that the Vietnamese Army assets from outside agencies. The one major shortcoming in the early years in some but not all instances, was their lack of military training and discipline.

        The initial group of local PF’s assigned to the B Company Ambush Teams displayed exceptional courage and dedication to their squads and missions. The mere fact that they were tasked with rooting out local enemy soldiers and sympathizers from their village while on duty then required to live weaponless within the village when off duty was a daunting task. In many instances the MP squads saw to it that their PF was provided with a personal weapon to carry when off duty, usually a .45 cal. pistol.