1968 Time Line ~ Ambush & Recon ~ 720th Military Police Battalion Reunion Association ~ Vietnam History Project ~ This Page Last Updated 10 January 2010
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The river patrol linked up with a twelve man B Company and Popular Forces (PF), recon squad 90 minutes later and returned back to the base camp. They immediately came under fire after leaving their boats. During the fire fight two VC were killed. Inside the bunkers they seized medical supplies, a Viet Cong flag, rifle, and various documents, which later proved to be of considerable intelligence value. No MP's or PF's were wounded in the engagement. |
10 February The 615th MP Company ambush and recon Area of Operations (AO),within the Battalion TAOR was assimilated by the 720th ambush teams when the company was detached from the the Battalion and reassigned to the 95th MP Battalion (Long Binh Post). |
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Consolidation 26 June In a consolidation move B Company was designated by the Battalion to take over all TAOR operations under Operation STABILIZE. All A and C company, Village Outpost, ambush, and River Patrol operational missions were transferred to B Company. |
Ambush Patrol Cycle The B Company ambush mission cycle consisted of a three day and night reconnaissance in a given area, followed by six days of night ambush. The seven man ambush squad, consisted of one Sergeant (E-5) or Corporal (E4) as squad leader, and six enlisted men. |
They would carry enough rations, water and supplies to sustain them for this time period. If for some unforeseen reason they ran low they were always able to proceed to one of the four village outpost in the TAOR to resupply, or have a river patrol boat meet them along one of the many streams or river banks. |
During the reconnaissance mission the ambush team would look for signs the enemy had been using the area. They would check old established trails for evidence of recent use, as well as look for evidence of new trails. The squad leader would determine the night ambush position based on previous activity that occurred in the area or, new intelligence developed during the days recon. In some instances the squad would group in a site just before dark and shortly after, move to the preferred site to throw off any enemy observers that may have been watching their activities during the day. |
The map coordinates of the squad position would be called into 720th Battalion Tactical Operations Command (TOC), to plot local Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) artillery fire and coordinate assistance if needed later in the night. Just before dawn the squad would leave the ambush site and begin another days patrol in a different area of the assigned sector.
On the morning of the fourth day the squad would end the reconnaissance mission. Depending on where the area of operation was located, they would walk out to a highway, outpost, or have the river patrol pick them up. |
Upon arrival at the company area the squad leader would notify TOC of any intelligence information not previously reported via radio. The squad members would clean their weapons and prep their gear before heading to the mess hall for a hot breakfast or lunch, depending on the time of return. Much needed sleep would follow a refreshing shower.
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That evening the squad would be back out and set up the first of seven nights of ambushes in the sector they just reconned. The morning of the eighth day the squad would return to post, have the remainder of that day and the morning and afternoon of the next to relax, then the cycle would begin again in a different sector of the TAOR. The only break in this routine would come if TOC obtained new "hot" intelligence or an incident of enemy activity occurred. In those instances the squad would be held over in the morning after a night ambush and be asked to conduct a search or join other squads in a sweep for the remainder of the day. |
At times squads were moved from their ambush locations to an outpost to beef up the defense capabilities. There were also times when a squad would be assigned to night walking patrols of villages. Instead of spending their night at an ambush location they would be expected to patrol one of the villages and its surrounding roads throughout the night. The bottom line was an ambush squad was the instant reaction force for any incidents that occurred within the TAOR. It was long, hard, tiresome duty and many men looked for any reason to avoid or get out of the ambush platoon. The one plus factor in working ambush was the time passed quickly and you never received any "make work" assignments when in the company area. |
September A Special Forces infantry MOS trained 2LT by the name of Robert Chavis arrived at B Company and was assigned as the Ambush Platoon Leader. Under his leadership the tactics used by the squads changed drastically, and for the better. 2LT Chavis recognized that the primary local VC base camps were located just outside the Battalion TAOR, south of the Buong River in the Area of Operations of the Royal Thai Army, Black Panther Division. 2LT Chavis targeted the back river areas for much of our activities in the latter months of 1968. The LT, who spent much of his time on day and night ambush and recon patrols with each of the squads, provided the much needed intensive on-the-job training for the men. |
Rubber Raft Patrols Before the month was over 2LT Chavis acquired a seven man rubber raft and trained the men for its use in night ambush patrols on the back river and streams of the TAOR. The training was done in the Rach Bien River by the "Steel Bridge" that separated the villages of Long Hung and An Hoa Hung. Use of the raft resulted in several successful ambushes both on and off the river. |
During one night raft patrol a Viet Cong way station was discovered. Ambush Team #76 accompanied by 2LT Chavis, using a Star Light Scope, were paddling up (east) the Buong River, spotted a flicker of light in the thick woods near a stream junction. The LT and CPL Watson crawled approximately 50 yards through a rice paddy and were able to observe several VC sitting around a bunker just inside the tree line. Because the bunker was in the Royal Thai Army area, the patrol withdrew. 2LT Chavis and two ambush teams returned on another night successfully ambushing the VC and captured three sampans, supplies, ammunition and weapons. |
In January 1969 Ambush Team #76 accompanied by 2LT Chavis, & 1LT Ed Mendez ambushed two VC sampans traveling on the river resulting in three dead VC and the capture of the sampans, supplies, ammunition and weapons. |
Black Pajama Patrols Another innovation by 2LT Chavis were the periodic black pajama operations in several of the villages. 2LT Chavis, CPL Thomas T. Watson, and the squads Popular Forces (PF) interpreter SGT Xichs, would wear black pajamas instead of jungle fatigue uniforms. Based on current intelligence on known and active VC sympathizers and family members, the LT would pick a village and lead the squad on a raid. The squad would sneak up on the residence of a VC family or sympathizer and surround it. The LT, CPL Watson, and PF would approach. The PF would either ask for the VC family member or family friend by name, or pose as an associate of the VC. Once the door was opened the three would rush inside the hooch search it for weapons or contraband and interrogate the occupants at gunpoint. Several raids were conducted at different villages during the night village walking patrols. Then as word got around the raids were halted for a period of time. Although none of the raids produced any VC, the psychological effect it had on the local VC families and friends was successful. Intelligence information received indicated they were now scared to come into the villages at night for fear of being caught by the black pajama patrols. |
Tax Collector Patrols The squads also ran tax collector patrols on the back rivers during the afternoon and evening before dark. The VC would hide in their sampan in small streams along the river bank and wait for the farmers and merchants that used the river highways to return from a days work. As the sampan passed the VC would paddle out and force them at gun point to come to the bank and there they would take money or materials as a war tax. When the complaints started coming into intelligence, 2LT Chavis formulated a plan. Civilian sampans were obtained by bartering with cooperative farmers to operate them. An MP in black pajamas and PF dressed in Vietnamese civilian clothing were placed on each. The MP would stay hidden in the bottom of the sampan as it traveled the back rivers in the late afternoon. After a shoot-out with a VC tax collector the second day of the operation, no new complaints were received. The patrols were effective in shutting down the VC tax collection plan. |
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Incidents of enemy activity began increasing sharply throughout the eastern half of the TAOR along the Buong River. |
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Several reconnaissance patrols and night ambushes resulted in the observation of squad and platoon sized enemy movement, seizure of enemy weapons, supplies, sampans and dead local and Main Force VC without any MP ambush squad casualties. Unknown to the ambush squads at the time, was that the increased activity was a result of the 5th NVA Divisions planning and preparation in the TAOR for their 23 February 1969 Post Tet New Years attack along the southern perimeter (Highway 317) of Long Binh Post. |
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